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Abstract Despite the unanticipated difficulties created by the current and 
prolonged recession in the Japanese economy, measures to create alternative 
jobs for Nippon Steel employees displaced by the closure of a substantial 
proportion of the facilities at the Kamaishi Steelworks in 1989 have succeeded 
in creating more employment opportunities than have been lost. Nevertheless, 
there have been continuing concerns about the viability of the remaining wire 
mill, and measures have been taken to reduce costs which have had impacts on 
Nippon Steel's "new enterprises" strategy and the management of outplace-
ments. The experiences of Nippon Steel and of "invited enterprises" have also 
underlined the continuing disadvantages that Kamaishi faces in sustaining a 
viable industrial economy given the city's remote and inaccessible location.
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1 Introduction 
   On March 25, 1989, the fires of the blast furnace at the Nippon Steel Corporation's 
Kamaishi Steelworks were finally extinguished, bringing to an end over a century of 
steelmaking in one of Japan's best known single industry "company towns", and 
reducing steel-related production in Kamaishi to the output from a solitary wire mill 
(Sargent and Wiltshire  1988  ; Yorimitsu 1993). On the eve of the 1989 closure, Nippon 
Steel had 2,220 regular employees in Kamaishi, of whom fewer than 300 would be found 
productive employment in the wire mill. In the face of this dramatic reduction in the 
demand for labour within the company's core business in Kamaishi, the impact that the 
direct, indirect and induced effects of this retrenchment would inevitably have upon the 
local economy, and the continuing commitment of Nippon Steel to maintaining the 
system of tenure known (somewhat misleadingly) as "lifetime employment", the 
company adopted a three-pronged strategy to generate new jobs and otherwise 
discharge its responsibilities to its workforce and to the local community. First, it 
sought retirements amongst older workers and arranged for permanent transfers of 
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more mobile younger workers to other steelworks elsewhere in Japan (Wiltshire 1992). 
Second, it implemented a number of "temporary" measures, such as outplacements and 
loans of workers to other firms and other Nippon Steel plants, in order to buy time to 
implement the third and most radical element of the strategy. This was the creation 
in Kamaishi of new jobs for its surplus workers in fields sometimes totally unrelated 
to steelmaking, either directly through the creation of "new enterprises" owned and 
managed by the steelworks itself, or indirectly through inducements to other com-
panies to relocate their activities in Kamaishi, using Nippon Steel's own contacts and 
resources to reinforce the efforts of the local authorities to attract new industries to 
the city. 
   Nippon Steel's employment strategy in the immediate aftermath of the closure of 
its steelmaking facilities in Kamaishi was described in an earlier paper (Wiltshire 
1991), which identified reasons for guarded optimism about the city's future. The 
present paper examines some of the outcomes of Nippon Steel's job creation efforts 
over the subsequent decade, a period marked by a rapid, prolonged and unanticipated 
deterioration of the overall economic climate within Japan following the bursting of 
the "bubble economy" of the late 1980s. The research is based on the results of field 
observations made and interviews conducted in Kamaishi in April and May 1996, and 
on reports published in the specialist steel industry press, including the newspaper 
Tekko Shimbun (hereafter denoted as  TS) and Nippon Steel's newsletter Shin Nippon 
Seitetsu Sokuho (hereafter SNSS).
2 Nippon Steel's employment strategy 
   The initial strategy to manage the reduction of the workforce at Kamaishi 
contained both short term and long term elements. The former included temporary 
loans and outplacements and the creation of new enterprises oriented more to job 
creation than to immediate profitability, while the latter included diversification of the 
product base in line with Nippon Steel's desire to reduce the dependency of the 
company as a whole on the health of the steel sector, and the attraction of new 
businesses to Kamaishi to provide permanent homes for redundant steel workers. 
   With the benefit of hindsight, it can be said that Nippon Steel's diversification 
plans embodied the optimism which underlay the "bubble economy", and like many 
other companies (in the steel industry and beyond), Nippon Steel discovered in the 
harsher economic climate of the 1990s that building new positions in established 
markets in which competition is already keen is difficult and expensive, and the costs 
of doing so are much harder to bear when the core business is itself under attack from 
competitors at home and abroad. Fig. 1 suggests that Nippon Steel has been success-
ful in slimming down the workforce in its Steel Division at Kamaishi to match the
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Fig. 1 Employment adjustment amongst Nippon Steel production workers at the Kamai-
   shi Steelworks,  1988-1996 
 Source  : Shin Nippon Seitetsu Kamaishi Seitetsujo 1996. 
 Notes  : (1) The data upon which this graph is based are for production workers  (gijutsu-
shoku) who are registered employees of Nippon Steel (zaiseki  jinin) only, and exclude 
administrative personnel (shumushoku). Over the 1988-1996 period the number of admin-
istrative personnel (excluding those on outplacement) employed by Nippon Steel at the 
Kamaishi Steelworks fell from 481 to 107 (of whom 82 were assigned to the Steel Division). 
(2) According to the data presented in Table 1 in Wiltshire (1991), on January 1, 1990 there 
were 270 production workers in the Steel Division, 400 in the New Enterprises Division, 
and 450 engaged in "Other Activities", including outplacement (shukko). These data are 
not directly comparable with the data upon which this graph is based, for the following 
 reasons  : (i) The data used in Wiltshire (1991) classified as workers in the Steel Division 
only those actually at work in the wire  mill  : workers on temporary loan to other Nippon 
Steel plants (shokan oen) or other companies (shagai haken) or temporarily engaged in 
scrapping redundant equipment or working on environmental improvements within the 
steelworks compound (a total of 315 workers as of January 1, 1990) were classified under 
"Other Activities" . The present series counts these workers as part of the Steel Division 
workforce (recorded as 559 in total on April 1,  1990). (ii) The data for employment in the 
New Enterprises Division in Wiltshire (1991) include registered Nippon Steel employees 
actually working for majority-owned subsidiary companies such as Enicom, Finetec and 
Nittetsu Business Promote (NBP), while the series upon which the graph is based classifies 
only employees in directly-managed enterprises as workers in New Enterprises (recorded 
as 167 in total on April 1,  1990)  : employees working for majority-owned subsidiaries are 
counted under Outplacement (355 in total). A reclassification of the employment data in 
Wiltshire (1991) shows that there were 160 Nippon Steel production workers employed in 
directly-managed New Enterprises on January 1, 1990, and 375 on outplacement.
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requirements of the wire mill (identified as 270 production workers in 1990), but the 
success of an enterprise is to be measured by profitability, not employment, and the 
economic performance of the wire mill has been a source of increasing concern, and the 
focus of an increasing share of the company's attention, during the 1990s. From 
employment creation, Nippon Steel's primary goal has gradually but inexorably 
shifted to ensuring the survival of its core business in Kamaishi. 
   The company's response has included efforts to promote synergies between the 
mill, its own new enterprises and new businesses entering the area, to help reduce wire 
making costs and expand demand for the mill's products. As we shall see below, these 
efforts have met with only limited success. Like many other companies, Nippon Steel 
has also refocussed its manpower reduction strategy from slimming down the number 
of production workers to a direct assault on the administrative bureaucracy, by 
rationalising its management systems and increasing the distance between itself and 
redundant workers on outplacement, many of whom have been required to accept a 
permanent transfer of their employment contracts (tenseki). Fig. 1 shows that levels 
of outplacement amongst the production workforce have remained high, due partly to 
replenishment from the pool displaced from the Steel Division, and these workers too 
have been under pressure to leave Nippon Steel, as the company has sought to reduce 
the burden which subsidies for outplacements place on the wire mill's accounts. The 
same motive has fuelled prolonged (and on occasion frustrating) efforts to coax the 
company's directly managed new enterprises into a healthy enough condition to enable 
their disposal to subsidiaries as going concerns. All of these strands in the recent 
history of the Kamaishi mill will be explored in subsequent sections, along with the 
performance of some of the major new businesses which have striven to operate 
successfully in Kamaishi during the 1990s, again with mixed results which mirror some 
of the difficulties which Nippon Steel has itself confronted, not  least those derived from 
Kamaishi's location.
3 The wire mill
   The wire mill at the Kamaishi Steelworks first entered production on October 14, 
1961. It was extensively refurbished in 1975 and again in 1981, and under Nippon 
Steel's Fourth Rationalisation Plan (1987-90) its  efficiency was enhanced by the recon-
struction of the heating furnace and other improvements which removed any hint of 
technical obsolescence. Shorn of its local supply of crude steel by the closure of the 
blast furnace and related facilities in 1989, the  mill has since relied for its raw material 
on 18 meter long steel billets imported by sea from Nippon Steel's giant steelworks at 
Kimitsu on Tokyo Bay. Despite the inconvenience this implies, and intense competi-
tion from similar mills located elsewhere in Japan, including three owned by Nippon
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Steel itself at Kimitsu, Hikari and Muroran, the Kamaishi wire mill has remained 
competitive and (occasionally) profitable, thanks to the strong reputation for quality 
enjoyed by its products, the introduction of new and superior grades , and a continuous 
assault on the mill's cost structure. 
    The mill produces a range of thicknesses and qualities of wire , but its most 
important product has been and remains steel cord for radial  tyres  : it entered the 
1990s with a 70% share of the Japanese market and a 25% share of the world market 
for this product (Kinzoku Tokuho November 22, 1991). Other uses for Kamaishi wire 
have ranged from the monumental—over half of the steel cable used in the construc-
tion of the Seto Ohashi Bridge over the Inland Sea was manufactured from Kamaishi 
wire—to the prosaic, the latter exemplified by the many millions of stainless steel balls 
which fuel Japan's ubiquitous pachinko machines. 
   At the beginning of the 1990s the Kamaishi mill had the capacity to produce 58,000 
tons of wire per month, and a break-even point of 40,000 tons . Strenuous efforts were 
subsequently made to reduce the latter to around 36,000 tons, in keeping with a level 
of output which has fluctuated between 30,000 and 45,000 tons per month. The 
wherewithal to achieve this goal has not lain entirely in Nippon Steel's own hands, 
since the price of any particular grade of wire is sensitive to market conditions . 
Transport costs also effect competitiveness, and are of particular significance for such 
a remote  location. Given the specialised nature of the mill's output it is hardly 
surprising that its markets are located all over  Japan  : in the first half of 1995, for 
example, 26% of domestic sales were to the Kansai District, 23% closer at hand in 
Tohoku, 19% to customers in the Kanto District and 11% in Chugoku (Shin Nippon 
Seitetsu Kamaishi Seitetsujo 1996). Exports are limited in  volume  : over the same 
period less than 10% of production was exported directly, although a much higher (if 
indeterminate) proportion ended up in overseas markets embodied in products such as 
radial tyres. Export sales have been influenced in part by transport costs, but also 
(and importantly) by the fluctuating value of the yen. The need to boost exports has 
been recognised as a way of enhancing the mill's profitability at times when the yen has 
been comparatively weak. In 1997, for example, a drive began to raise the proportion 
of wire directly exported above 20% (TS May 14, 1997) to take advantage of the 
favourable exchange rate at that time, and to counter the weakness in domestic 
demand caused by stagnation in Japan's domestic economy. 
   The reduction of labour inputs is an inevitable component of any drive to reduce 
costs, and the workforce within the wire mill fell progressively over the decade with 
the introduction of automated techniques and other improvements to the production 
process (Fig. 1). From a target of 270 production workers in 1990, actual employment 
of registered Nippon Steel workers in the wire mill had fallen to 187 by 1996, not 
counting 82 managerial and administrative staff also assigned to the mill. Continuous
90 Richard WILTSHIRE
reductions in labour costs helped to keep wire production in Kamaishi profitable , until 
recently at least. Losses have been posted by the mill since the second half of the 1997 
fiscal year, in the face of very difficult market conditions, but operating profits were 
made in the second half of FY1994, throughout FY1995 , and in the first half of FY1997 
 (TS January 20, 1998 and January 26, 1999). However, these calculations ignore the 
ongoing costs of subsidies to keep workers outplaced from the wire mill in jobs 
elsewhere, costs which have continually outweighed the mill's operating profits, with 
the result that the Kamaishi Steelworks as a whole failed to make an overall profit on 
its ordinary account (ie. inclusive of these non-production costs) at any time in the 
1990s. 
   Costs have also been attacked through improvements to the production process 
and other means to enhance the technical efficiency of wire making at Kamaishi . 
Such improvements fall into three main  areas  : enhanced processing , product innova-
tion, and improvements to materials and product handling and flows—the last of these 
having distinct geographical implications. 
   Processing has been enhanced through the introduction of technologies such as 
LIAS (the Linked Automatic Processing System), which went on-line in 1996. This 
system automated the microscopic sampling and inspection of wire essential for 
quality control and enabled the complete de-staffing of this component of the inspec-
tion process (TS May 22, 1996). Product innovation has centred on the introduction of 
ever finer grades of wire, right down to ultra-fine wire with a diameter of only 10 
microns, less than that of a human hair, as well as 40 micron needle wire used 
extensively in the computer industry. Improvements within more traditional product 
lines been also been  sought  : the mill has endeavoured to establish much closer 
relationships with its customers to better understand their needs , and it has obtained 
ISO 9001 certification for its development, manufacturing and control systems as an 
overt guarantee of quality (TS November 19, 1996). But the pressure to innovate has 
been relentless, and has intensified with the rapid deterioration in market conditions in 
the late 1990s. As the General Manager of the Kamaishi Works recently  explained  : 
"We have to do more to devel op new products. Competitive is fierce, and it is fair to 
say that the true value of this mill is going to be questioned in respect of whether or 
not it has the capacity to develop new products that will succeed on world markets" 
(TS January 26, 1999). 
   Significant cost reductions have also been achieved through rationalisations in the 
handling of materials and distribution of products. In 1996, for example, plans were 
announced for the construction of an all weather berth in Kamaishi Harbour , the 
largest single investment in wire-related facilities at the Kamaishi Works since 1989 
(TS May 7, 1996). At the time of this announcement around 70% of Kamaishi's wire 
output was distributed to end users by sea, and the remaining 30% by road, so any
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improvements to the quality of the port facilities in Kamaishi had significant implica-
tions. Sea-born distribution of the mill's output was further improved in 1998 when 
arrangements were concluded for the scheduled roll-on/roll-off ferry which plies the 
route between Tomakomai (in Hokkaido) and Kawasaki to call additionally at 
Kamaishi to take on consignments of wire destined for the Kanto District  (TS May 25, 
1998). The cost of overland shipments has also been reduced by using rail freight 
containers to supply specific markets, such as the Hokuriku District (on the Japan Sea 
coast), where this offers advantages over both road and sea transport. Until 1997 wire 
destined for Hokuriku was sent by ship to Osaka, and thence by lorry overland to end 
users. This caused problems with delivery dates and with the maintenance of product 
quality in transit. The use of rail freight containers, transported by road across the 
Kitakami Highlands to the rail freight terminal at Morioka, made it possible to 
transport goods without reference to the weather, and to reduce the period in transit 
from five days to four. The elimination of intermediate handling also helped to 
maintain the quality of the product (SNSS March 19, 1997). The handling of products 
within the mill prior to distribution has also been improved significantly with the 
construction of a second automated racked storage facility, which has doubled storage 
capacity to 20,000 tons (or two weeks' output) and helped to reduce spoilage losses by 
reducing the amount of handling required  ( TS August 19, 1998).
4 The quest for synergies 
   Another way that Nippon Steel has attempted to boost the profitability of the wire 
mill has been through the encouragement of new enterprises which either make use of 
the mill's output or impact on the cost of the mill's raw materials (Wiltshire 1991, p. 
21). Until very recently, however, this quest for local synergies had proved unproduc-
tive. The only business in Kamaishi that makes significant use of wire products is 
Koshuha Netsuren, a manufacturer of reinforced concrete pilings, which opened its 
Kamaishi plant in 1982, well before the closure of the blast furnace, and which has not 
undergone any noticeable expansion in the  1990s  : employment at its facility in 
Kamaishi actually fell between 1990 and 1996. Nor have efforts to expand demand for 
wire products elsewhere in the Tohoku District met with much success, beyond an 
increase in supplies to Tokyo Steel Cord's factory in Kitakami (SNSS October 19, 
1994). 
   Other steel-related linkages have been established, but with other parts of Nippon 
Steel's business, not the wire mill. Shirakawa and NS Okamura are the two main 
examples, both of which are discussed at length in Section 7 below. These companies 
combine consumption of steel materials (brought in from elsewhere) with the use of 
blue collar labour formerly employed in the steelworks itself. A newer (if much
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smaller) example is Dowa Forging, a Tokyo-based company that controls 95% of the 
domestic market for the forks attached to heavy duty fork-lift trucks, which opened 
a factory in Kamaishi in 1996 to manufacture medium-sized forks with an initial 
workforce of around 20 people (SNSS June 23, 1995). Amongst Nippon Steel's direct-
ly-managed new enterprises, that manufacturing specialised bodies for commercial 
vehicles (founded in 1989) has the most obvious linkages with the steel industry as a 
consumer of sheet metal, and was once hailed as "an example of a successful enterprise 
which is serving a new market but also making good use of the workforce's existing 
skills" (Wiltshire 1991, p. 9). This judgment was  premature  : the truck body business 
struggled throughout the 1990s to achieve profitability, as production continued to lag 
behind capacity, and by 1996 employment had  halved from a peak of thirty registered 
Nippon Steel employees in 1991 to just fifteen, aided by a handful of workers from the 
company's  local subcontractors. Other linkages to the core business are still more 
 tenuous  : specially treated timber from the Kamaishi "Nittetsu Wood" enterprise, for 
example, has been used to line the holds and loading cradles of ships carrying hot steel 
between Nippon Steel's various facilities around Japan (SNSS May 11, 1994). 
   The quest for synergistic links finally began to bear fruit in 1995, however, when 
a wholly new opportunity arose for Nippon Steel to make productive use of under-
utilised assets in Kamaishi. A revision to the Electricity Enterprises Law introduced 
a new power supply regime to Japan, the "bidding system for the wholesale supply of 
electricity", which allowed Independent Power Producers (IPPs) to engage in electrical 
power supply, breaking a monopoly previously held by the electricity utility com-
panies. Nippon Steel responding by concluding contracts to supply electricity from 
new coal-fired power stations to be constructed at five of its  steelworks  : Yawata, 
Hirohata, Muroran, Oita and Kamaishi. The Kamaishi IPP enterprise will have a 
generating capacity of 136,000 kW, and is scheduled to come on stream in July 2000. 
According to the company, the aim of participating in electricity production "is to 
meet growing demand for electricity by supplying low-cost electricity on a stable 
basis, produced employing power-generation know-how acquired from in-house power 
generation and utilising steelworks infrastructure such  as spacious land, exclusive 
ports and raw material yards" (Nippon Steel 1998,  p.  8). In Kamaishi the land 
required for this enterprise has been released by the demolition of the derelict blast 
furnace, completed in March 1997. The new power station, which represents the 
largest single investment made within the Kamaishi Steelworks compound for many 
years, promises cheaper power supplies and hence reduced production costs in the wire 
mill. Coincidentally, the construction work associated with this enterprise has itself 
generated demand for the products of local manufacturers at a time when markets are 
very hard to find. The concrete piles to support the weight of the new structure and 
its turbines contain wire from the mill, the reinforcing rods within the concrete that
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forms the structure's base were made from the scrap generated by the demolition of 
the blast furnace, and the structural elements are being assembled from steel beams by 
Shirakawa at its Kamaishi factory (TS November 24, 1998).
5 Rationalising administration and outplacements 
   Initial plans for managing employment reductions in Kamaishi following the 1989 
closure were primarily geared towards reducing the blue collar production workforce 
 (gijutsushoku) by whatever means possible (Wiltshire 1991). During the 1990s, how-
ever, many large Japanese companies refocussed their cost-cutting efforts on the 
reduction of administrative overheads, in an assault on the traditional job security of 
the white-collar "salaryman" (Wiltshire 1995, Chapter 9). While Nippon Steel has 
worked hard to reduce its costs and still defend the principle of "lifetime employment" 
for its core workforce (both white and blue collar), the scope of that commitment has 
suffered erosion at the margins as the recession in the industry has deepened, a trend 
which has particularly affected office staff, older workers, and those who are already 
half adrift on outplacements. 
   In 1989, 33.2% of the permanent (zaiseki) workforce of 1,760 at the Kamaishi 
Works was classified as administrative staff (shumushoku), a share which had fallen 
marginally to 30.8% by 1996 out of a workforce of 970. If we exclude from the 
calculations those white collar workers who had been outplaced, however, the effect is 
far more  dramatic  :  23.3% of the locally-based permanent workforce at the Kamaishi 
Works was classified as white collar in 1989, but by 1996 this had been slashed to just 
13.8% (Shin Nippon Seitetsu Kamaishi Seitetsujo 1996). The administrative structure 
of the steelworks was slimmed down, and extensive investment was made in informa-
tion technology to enable individual managers to take on more responsibilities, 
enhance their span of control and hence increase their efficiency. Under the Third 
Medium Term Management Plan for the Kamaishi Works (FY1994-1996), the com-
pany aimed to rationalise its administrative personnel by 45%—compared with a 20% 
reduction in the production workforce (SNSS May 2, 1994). 
   Meanwhile, older workers (of whatever kind) who had previously been outplaced 
faced pressure to sever their links with their old employer. In the immediate after-
math of the furnace closure, the emphasis had been on creating new employment 
opportunities to absorb redundant workers irrespective, in the case of directly 
managed new enterprises, of whether those enterprises might be profitable or not. In 
the 1990s such generosity became untenable, given the impact of the subsidies paid in 
respect of outplaced workers on the profitability of the wire mill. Under its Third 
Medium Term Management Plan, Nippon Steel identified the transfer of employee 
registration (tenseki) to the destination company of the outplacement following volun-
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tary retirement from Nippon Steel (and hence severance of any obligation to pay 
subsidies) as an important means of reducing its costs, although these transfers were 
also presented as being in the best interests of the destination company. Under the 
Plan, Nippon Steel required all of its employees in Kamaishi over the age of fifty-four 
to transfer permanently to other companies, and by April 1, 1996, a total of 272 former 
employees, the majority of them blue collar workers, had resigned from Nippon Steel 
and registered instead as employees of the companies to which they had been previous-
ly outplaced. Of these former Nippon Steel employees, a substantial minority (114, or 
42%) were taken on by Nittetsu Fine Products (Shin Nippon Seitetsu Kamaishi 
 Seitetsujo 1996).
6 Relinquishing the new enterprises 
   As worries over the profitability of its core business in Kamaishi mounted, Nippon 
Steel increased its efforts to  offload its remaining new enterprises and thereby reduce 
cost pressures on the mill. When interviewed on the subject in 1996 the General 
Manager of the Kamaishi Works was  blunt  : he noted that while the wire mill was 
generating profits, costs in the directly managed new enterprises were "not under 
control, because they are overstaffed. The directly managed enterprises employ over 
90 people, and this puts pressure on costs and makes it difficult to achieve overall 
profitability"  (TS' April 30, 1996). The company had never intended to maintain a 
permanent role in the management of these enterprises, and during the 1990s each met 
one of two  fates  : closure, on the grounds that the enterprise concerned had no 
prospect of ever making a profit, or transfer into the arms of a subsidiary company 
established specifically to take responsibility for developing the enterprise into a going 
concern. 
   The subsidiaries initially established to perform the latter function were NBP 
("Nittetsu Business Promote") Tohoku, founded in 1987, and, Finetec, founded in 1986, 
which were merged in April 1993 to form Nittetsu Fine Products (NFP), a company 
jointly owned by Nippon Steel (64% of share capital) and its general trading subsidiary 
Nittetsu Shoji (36%) (SNSS May 13, 1996). NFP inherited a number of successful 
enterprises from its predecessor companies, including the manufacture of body 
warmers and deoxygenation tablets from Finetec and soy-based reconstituted protein 
meat substitute sold under the name "tanpakki" from NBP Tohoku (Wiltshire 1991, 
pp. 7-8). Since 1993 NFP has absorbed most of the remaining new enterprises former-
ly managed by Nippon Steel, although some activities were farmed out to other firms 
such as Yamada Seimitsu Seisakusho, which took over Nippon Steel's CNC lathe 
enterprise in 1991, or simply shut down, the main casualty being an unsuccessful 
ceramic fabrication enterprise.
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   At the time NFP was formed, Nippon Steel's directly-managed new enterprises 
employed around 100 former steelworkers, half the number employed just three years 
earlier. As a senior official in the Kamaishi Works noted at the time, this didn't mean 
that 100 workers had lost their means of support. Rather, it signified that while 
Nippon Steel had initially created the means to keep 200 people in some form of 
employment in these enterprises, it subsequently found better, more productive, and 
more profitable things for half of them to do  (?S May 11, 1993). The implication, of 
course, is that the 100 workers remaining in the directly-managed enterprises still 
 hadn't been found something better to do, and great efforts were expended during the 
1990s to reverse this situation. 
   The first transfer of a directly managed new enterprise to NFP took place in July 
1993, when it acquired the Miniature Orchid Cultivation Centre, a  small but successful 
horticultural enterprise located on the Heita land reclamation site which has since won 
national recognition for the quality of its products. That left seven directly managed 
enterprises still to be dealt with, three of which (the manufacture of Nittetsu Wood and 
mechanical seals, and a laboratory specialising in the preservation of exhumed cultural 
treasures) were considered to be doing sufficiently well to justify their being transfer-
red to NFP in May 1996, adding between them seventeen former steelworkers to the 
existing NFP workforce of 286 (Shin Nippon Seitetsu Kamaishi Seitetsujo 1996). 
   The Resin-Injected Wood Products Fabrication Centre (Nittetsu Wood), which 
was founded in 1989, has grown very slowly in employment terms, but it has success-
fully established its reputation in a number of niche markets. Before being transfer-
red to NFP it had already entered the market for "log houses", it had developed its 
own line of garden furniture for use in public parks, and the early promise of sales to 
the railway sleeper replacement market had been born  out  : by early 1993 it had 
supplied 50,000 sleepers to JR  (TS April 22, 1993). The water-resisting and non-toxic 
qualities of its products subsequently helped to secure new uses in civil engineering 
projects in aquatic environments, such as reinforcement structures for river banks and 
decking for nature trails in wetland areas, such as that installed at Lake Izunuma in 
Miyagi Prefecture in 1998  (IS March 17, 1998). Given these successes it may seem 
odd that Nittetsu Wood was not in a fit state to be spun off at an earlier date. The 
problem, however, and one by no means unique to this enterprise, was that healthy 
sales could not be translated into healthy profits, because competition even in niche 
markets was fierce and Nippon Steel had no inherent advantage as a supplier—other 
than the ability and willingness to write off losses, both of which steadily evaporated. 
   The second enterprise transferred to NFP ownership in 1996 produces "mechani-
cal seals", devices which prevent leakage around pistons under hostile environmental 
conditions widely used in industries such as paper-making, oil-refining and steelmak-
ing. In 1992 another of Nippon Steel's directly managed new enterprises, the Preci-
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sion Castings Foundry (see below), started to manufacture and assemble components 
for modular mechanical seals under license from a company called SealTec. The new 
product was an instant  success  : orders from within the Nippon Steel Group, including 
the Kimitsu and Nagoya steelworks and Nittetsu Chemicals, were soon followed by 
others from unrelated companies and from abroad  (TS April 14, 1992). For the first 
two years mechanical seal production and assembly were simply treated as part of the 
foundry's business, but the market potential of this product eventually prompted a 
rethink, culminating in the takeover of SealTec by Nippon Steel in 1994 and the 
relaunch of mechanical seal production at Kamaishi as an enterprise in its own right, 
as a partnership between Nippon Steel, NFP and Mitsubishi Shoji. Despite the bright 
start, however, intense competition from other suppliers made it  difficult for the 
Kamaishi operation to come anywhere close to meeting its goal of a ten percent share 
of the domestic market. 
   Following the transfer of Nittetsu Wood, mechanical seal production and the 
Cultural Treasures Preservation Centre (Wiltshire 1991,  p.  9) to NFP in 1996, four 
directly managed enterprises remained for Nippon Steel either to offload or to close. 
In the event, all four were placed under NFP's management in February 1997, in return 
for payments for the land, the buildings and other capital investments involved, plus 
royalties for the technologies embedded in these products  (TS March 17, 1997). This 
transfer took place not because these enterprises had finally become profitable, which 
they hadn't, but because Nippon Steel had clearly decided to draw a line under its 
employment creation ventures in Kamaishi after a decade of involvement, in order to 
concentrate its energies on its core business of wire making. 
   The future for all four enterprises is uncertain. The fabrication of truck bodies 
has already been mentioned, and in this enterprise production has continued to lag 
behind capacity, despite Nippon Steel's best efforts to rationalise the production 
process and thus counter fierce competition in a recession-hit market. In its turn, 
NFP has adopted a new strategy which involves the creation of new niche markets 
through product development and targeted marketing (SNSS February 2, 1997). The 
Precision Castings Foundry (now known as Nittetsu Incaste) has also been mentioned 
—as the seedbed for the mechanical seals enterprise . After losing control of mechani-
cal seals to the new enterprise, the foundry faced difficulties in reducing costs quickly 
enough to make its remaining product lines profitable in their own right, although 
production of the components for the seals continued, and the business continued to 
grow rapidly. By the time control passed to NFP, the foundry employed 43 people in 
all, but of these only 5 were from Nippon Steel, the remaining 38 being employees of 
subcontractors, 15 of them women. The challenge facing NFP has been to find ways 
of reducing the number of stages in production (and hence the amount of handling 
required) within the foundry, and to standardise the range of products to raise
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efficiency through mass production and thereby reduce costs (TS February 27,  1997). 
The third enterprise transferred to NFP in 1997 was one of the very first to be 
established—the Kamaishi Engineering Centre. The Centre has always been geared 
primarily to soaking up excess supplies of redundant male steel workers, and in March 
1996 it had 40 Nippon Steel employees on its books (Shin Nippon Seitetsu Kamaishi 
Seitetsujo 1996). During the 1990s the range of work undertaken by the Centre 
expanded rapidly, both sectorally and geographically, in the search for profitable 
means of employing this labour. In 1994, for example, it took responsibility for 
machinery maintenance tasks in the main works, and thus made a direct contribution 
to the drive for greater efficiency within the wire mill, but it also achieved external 
 success  : in April 1994, for example, it was accredited as a designated competitive 
bidder by Iwate Prefecture in respect of business connected with the maintenance and 
preservation of prefecturally owned facilities and equipment. The geographical 
expansion of the Centre's activities has inevitably served to highlight the inconvenience 
of Kamaishi's location, however, even within Iwate Prefecture, and in response, the 
Centre has established a branch operation of its own in Kitakami City in central Iwate, 
to improve market access. As for the fourth enterprise, the Kamaishi Testing and 
Analysis Centre, which in 1996 provided employment for 18 of Nippon Steel's regis-
tered workers, while it has been successful in building on the inherited expertise of the 
Kamaishi Works in the testing and analysis of raw materials and final products in the 
metallurgical and heavy engineering industries, and in generating business from far 
beyond the confines of the steel industry, it faces the problem of generating  sufficient 
business to cover the high capital costs of the sophisticated equipment upon which its 
services depend. In taking over the Centre, NFP could at least draw some encourage-
ment from a reported increase in orders both from within and outside Iwate prefecture 
for both surface and internal analysis and structural analysis, fields in which, ceteris 
 paribus, demand is expected to increase in the future  (TS February 2, 1997). 
   The spinning off of these last  four directly-managed new enterprises should have 
brought Nippon Steel's decade of direct involvement in new enterprises to an end—and 
may have done so. Certainly there will be no repetition of the scale  or diversity of 
involvement in new enterprises, because the residual workforce in the wire  mill is so 
small. It is by no means inconceivable, however, that further deterioration in market 
conditions across the Japanese economy could undermine the viability of the wire 
operation to the point where Nippon Steel's commitment to maintaining employment 
will be tested yet again. Having experienced the extended birth pains of the enter-
prises now finally  offloaded to external management, however, the company seems 
unlikely to go willingly down the same path again.
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7 Mixed fortunes amongst the "invited enterprises" 
   Of far greater importance to Nippon Steel's plans (and indeed Kamaishi City's 
plans) for the long term resolution of the employment problem created by the 1989 
closures has been the encouragement of inward investment by so-called "invited 
enterprises" (yuchi kigyo). Between 1987 and 1990 such investments created over 800 
new jobs in Kamaishi (Wiltshire 1991, p. 15), and by 1996 total employment in all invited 
enterprises (excluding those in which Nippon Steel was a majority shareholder) was 
just under 2,000, including nearly 270 present or former employees of Nippon Steel 
(Table 1). The creation of so many new jobs in the Kamaishi area must be acknowled-
ged as a major achievement. Many of the invited enterprises, including large 
employers such as Nippon Phillips (formerly PNN), Iwate Hoken (ibid, p. 16) and Chita 
Seimitsu Kogyo, draw their labour supplies not from Nippon Steel but from local 
external labour markets, including those for new male and female high school gradu-
ates and former employees of Nippon Steel's subsidiaries and suppliers, and in so doing 
they have made an important contribution to the diversification of the local economy. 
Just three of the five largest invited enterprises account for over 80% of the new jobs 
created for present and former Nippon Steel employees, however, and therefore merit
Table 1 Employment in major "invited  enterpriseS 
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 Notes  :
Shin Nippon Seitetsu Kamaishi Seitetsujo 1996. 
Only those companies with 50 or more employees in Kamaishi have been listed 
by name. 
 *Companies with less than 50% Nippon Steel share ownership , but with 
directors appointed by Nippon Steel. 
 'Companies with insignificant or no Nippon Steel share ownership , and 
without directors appointed by Nippon Steel.
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particularly close attention. Of the three, the largest, SMC, has been notably success-
ful, but the other two, Shirakawa and NS Okamura , have faced problems which call 
into question the long term prospects for Nippon Steel's employment strategy in 
Kamaishi. 
    SMC is Japan's leading manufacturer of air compression equipment , and between 
1991, when production commenced at its Kamaishi factory , and 1996 it grew to rival 
Nippon Steel as the largest single employer in Kamaishi , and to far exceed Nippon 
Steel in this capacity once the effects of outplacement are taken into account . SMC 
has some technical linkages to Nippon Steel and its affiliates—it receives part of the 
output from the Precision Castings Foundry, for example (Kinzoku Tokuho November 
25, 1991)—and its factory is located on land formerly occupied by Nippon Steel 
company housing, but it depends primarily upon external labour markets for its 
employees in Kamaishi (less than 10% of its workforce originally came from Nippon 
Steel), around half of whom are females engaged in light assembly tasks , and the 
Kamaishi facility is just one of a dozen factories owned by the same company and 
manufacturing similar products. The future for the Kamaishi factory is contingent , 
therefore, not only upon the state of the market for air compression equipment but also 
on the relative costs of production here and at the company's other factories , in Japan 
and abroad. Low cost labour (by Japanese standards) and state of the art manufactur-
ing facilities are both positive factors for the company's future in  Kamaishi , but labour 
costs are high by international standards , and the production facilities will age, so 
there are no grounds for complacency regarding SMC's future contribution to  employ-
ment in Kamaishi. 
   Shirakawa, on the other hand, had drawn nearly half of its labour force in 
Kamaishi from Nippon Steel (Table 1), and accounts for fully half of all former Nippon 
Steel employees who have had their employment contracts transferred to invited 
enterprises. Shirakawa is a specialist steel frame fabricator , originally based in 
Aikawa in Kanagawa Prefecture, which opened what was at that time its first branch 
factory, on land formerly occupied by steelmaking facilities within the Kamaishi 
Works compound, in 1990. From a local perspective , Shirakawa was an ideal  catch  : 
it offered the prospect of jobs in heavy engineering well suited to men who had spent 
their working lives amidst the clatter and machinery of the steel mill , and thus an 
obvious destination for outplacements from Nippon Steel, as well as a chance for ex-
employees of local subcontractors to find jobs too. Thus, when the factory first 
opened, its staff of 70 included 40 outplaced Nippon Steel workers, and the hope was 
that this number would eventually rise to 100 or so, out of a total workforce of 150. 
At first all went  well  ; indeed, within a year of opening its Kamaishi Branch the 
company had announced plans to build a second factory on adjacent land , to build steel 
pillars and boxes, which would turn the installations at Kamaishi into a fully integrat-
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ed production facility for steel frame structures, with a total workforce of around 300, 
including  120--130 outplaced Nippon Steel workers (Wiltshire 1991, p. 17). 
   The fundamental problems which Shirakawa soon confronted, however, echo 
those which led to the downfall of Kamaishi as a centre for crude steelmaking in the 
first place, especially those related to Kamaishi's poor location. When it first com-
menced operations at Kamaishi, Shirakawa brought in most of its raw materials by 
sea, and the initial plan was to dispatch the factory's entire output by sea as well to 
the Southern Kanto market, at first in component  form for final assembly at Aikawa, 
but subsequently as  completed structures dispatched directly to construction sites in 
and around Tokyo. This plan was soon abandoned, however, in favour of overland 
transport by truck, because the alternative would have required prohibitively expen-
sive investments in transshipment facilities in Southern Kanto to enable onward 
deliveries. The plan also fell foul of the requirements of the "just-in-time" system of 
delivery to construction sites, which could only be met to the customers' satisfaction 
by using road transport. The result was that by 1995 some 90% of output left 
Kamaishi by road  (TS September 27, 1995). 
   Overland transport meant higher costs, plus the sheer inconvenience of transport-
ing very heavy and irregularly configured loads across the Sennin Pass to central Iwate 
Prefecture before completing the long journey south to Tokyo. At the time the 
Kamaishi facility was first mooted transport cost considerations were less pressing 
because the property market in Southern  Kanto was booming. But when the "bubble 
economy" burst, and market conditions tightened, the spatial margin of profitability 
retreated southwards, leaving the Kamaishi facility seriously exposed, and the com-
pany as a whole  facing a loss of around  9% on sales  (TS December 12, 1995). By then, 
the option for Shirakawa likewise to retreat south had been foreclosed by the cramped 
nature of its site in Aikawa, which could not accommodate further expansion, so in 
1995 it opted for the alternative of concentrating production at Kamaishi and selling 
off the Aikawa site, in the hope that the creation of a more efficient production system 
at Kamaishi would outweigh the transport cost penalties involved. At the same time, 
the company slimmed its overall production capacity—and its workforce in Aikawa, 
the bulk of which was offered "voluntary" retirement or redundancy terms (Shirakawa 
1996). 
   Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that Shirakawa's initial promise 
as a major source of new employment in Kamaishi failed to materialise. Its  workfor-
ce in Kamaishi peaked in July 1993 at 218, and fell back to 198 by April 1996 (Table 
1) as the company reduced the number of ex-Nippon Steel workers on its books. 
Worse was to follow. As the market deteriorated further, the company attempted a 
novel solution to its  problems  : in September 1996 it agreed to what was in effect a 
take-over bid from a much  larger steel fabricator, Kawada Kogyo, which took a  51%
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shareholding, thereby transferring Shirakawa from Nippon Steel's industrial grouping 
(keiretsu) to its own. The takeover transformed the location of the Kamaishi facility 
in terms of corporate organisation, for it now became one of four factories owned or 
controlled by Kawada Kogyo in Toyama, Shikoku, Tochigi and now Iwate, with a 
combined workforce in 1995 of over 1,600  (TS September 11, 1996). 
   This injection of new capital and managerial expertise might have turned Shira-
kawa's fortunes around in better times, but as the slump in the Japanese construction 
industry continued, so the new management was obliged to seek even more radical 
ways of controlling costs. One option considered was to diversify into a new field, 
bridge-building, which had inherent  attractions  : bridges are built all over Japan, not 
just in Southern Kanto, so there would be a greater chance of obtaining orders locally 
where the locational disadvantages of Kamaishi would count for less, and also, unlike 
the company's traditional markets, bridges are funded as public works, and expendi-
tures on public works have been an important form of  counter-cyclical spending. The 
option was rejected, however, on the grounds that there were already too many 
specialist firms in the market whose experience and expertise would give them a 
significant competitive edge over newcomers (TS November 4, 1998). Instead, the 
company opted to boost productivity by cutting its rate of subcontracting by 20%, and 
from November 1998 it began the phased introduction of a 10% across-the—board cut 
in wages for all its employees. 
   The other major employer of former Nippon Steel workers amongst Kamaishi's 
"invited enterprises" has fared little better in the current recessio n. NS Okamura was 
established in 1991 as a joint venture between Nippon Steel and Okamura Seisakusho, 
a leading manufacturer of metal office furniture and substantial end user of Nippon 
Steel's thin plate steel. Nippon Steel would contribute land, buildings and labour to 
the venture, while Okamura Seisakusho would supply its technical knowledge of 
production processes. Initial employment projections were that around 200 new jobs 
would be created, half of which would be filled by employees on outplacement from 
Nippon Steel (Kinzoku Tokuho July 9, 1991). A site for the new joint venture was 
found in a storage building in the steelworks' central storage yard, 30 workers were 
dispatched (haken) temporarily to Osaka for training by Okamura Seisakusho's Kansai 
subsidiary, and production began in September 1992, initially of desk extensions and 
flaps, but subsequently also including desk surfaces and legs, all of which were to be 
shipped to Okamura Seisakusho's Yokohama factory for final assembly. The sheet 
steel used at Kamaishi came from Nippon Steel's Kimitsu Works via the Coil Centre 
at Sendai where it was pre-processed (SNSS November 11, 1992). 
   The original sales target for the joint venture was subsequently missed by a wide 
margin, due primarily to the collapse of the  office furniture market which followed the 
demise of the "bubble economy". Ministry of International Trade and Industry
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figures show that between 1986 and 1990 production of office desks in Japan doubled 
from 2.2 million units to 4.4 million units—but then tumbled to 2.92 million units in 
1992, and 2.51 million units in 1994 (NS Okamura 1996). Poor market conditions were 
certainly reflected in the value of NS Okamura's output, which stalled at just one third 
of the initial target. The collapse of the market hit the Kamaishi operation particu-
larly hard, because it was geared up to produce components for high quality items of 
office furniture, but many cash-strapped companies responded to the recession by 
trading down to lower quality equipment, shifting demand to cheaper, standard models. 
In response, NS Okamura has diversified its output, to include items such as bedside 
cabinets, bookcases and even display stands for costermongers. Even so, as with 
sales, so employment targets have also been  missed  : as of April 1, 1996, the company 
still had only 123 employees, 52 of whom had been outplaced from Nippon Steel, half 
the number originally projected.
8 Conclusion
   While there are continuing and genuine concerns about the long term viability of 
new and invited enterprises in Kamaishi and indeed of the wire mill itself, these should 
not obscure a success story in employment creation which has largely justified the 
guarded optimism expressed at the beginning of the decade (Wiltshire 1991,  p.  21). 
More new jobs have been created in Kamaishi since the closure of the blast furnace 
than have been lost at the  steel mill, and many of these new jobs have been of types 
suited to the skills and expertise of former steelworkers. This performance has been 
all the more remarkable given the severe and unanticipated effects of the prolonged 
recession in Japan which have caused important changes in Nippon Steel's corporate 
strategies. Diversification plans for Kamaishi were once flagged as "a microcosm of 
what the company itself intends to become"  (ibid p. 4). In the event, developments at 
Kamaishi have certainly reflected trends elsewhere in Nippon Steel's operations, but 
not in the way anticipated, for the 1990s have seen a renewed challenge to the 
company's core business (and to the entire Japanese steel industry) which has required 
concentrated attention, unencumbered by new enterprises which have proved to be 
problematic and frequently loss-making. While redundant employees in Kamaishi 
have faced the uncertainties and inconveniences of outplacement—and latterly of 
resignation and reemployment by other firms, this too has been a reflection of Nippon 
Steel's evolving corporate strategy across the company as a whole, rather than of 
conditions specific to Kamaishi alone. 
   Nevertheless, the events of the past decade do demonstrate that Kamaishi's 
locational handicaps still matter, despite improvements to the port and seaborn 
transport links and to the main road between Kamaishi and central Honshu. The
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problems faced by Shirakawa and indeed by the wire mill itself are good illustrations 
of how Kamaishi's remoteness creates both physical problems  (difficulties of transport-
ing awkward loads and problems of deterioration of product quality in transit) and 
organisational problems (particularly in meeting the requirements of customers' "just 
in time" production systems). These handicaps can be and have been addressed 
through improvements to transport links, but the relative disadvantage of Kamaishi 
firms relative to alternative suppliers in locations closer to the main markets will 
always remain. And the decade has also shown that there are no easy ways of 
overcoming this locational disadvantage by substituting new businesses for old ones, 
given the intensely competitive environment which most new enterprises face. 
   In short, the battle to secure a viable economic future for Kamaishi has gone well 
so far but must continue. One thing that is certain, however, is that after a decade of 
managed contraction, Nippon Steel's own contribution to Kamaishi's future will 
inevitably be less prominent than in the past. Although the company still owns around 
a fifth of all habitable land in Kamaishi, and the majority of the city's industrial land, 
its steel-related operations are no longer the only major employer in Kamaishi, nor 
even the largest. As a result, the future prosperity of the city will be less obviously 
mediated and managed as an internal concern of one major company, and more 
directly affected by the overall health of the Japanese economy.
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